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 Humans routinely solve a variety of different kinds of causal reasoning problems. In this chapter, 
we focus on problems having the following basic form. An agent has various bits of information 
about some things that happen in the world: the order in which things happen, the frequencies 
and conditional frequencies with which they happen, the things that are associated with 
interventions, and so on. The agent observes something happen, and she wants to know what 
caused that thing to happen. More specifically, she wants to know what actually caused the thing 
she observed to happen, not what might have caused it to happen or what typically causes similar 
things to happen. For example, she might want to know what actually caused her heartburn last 
night or she might want to know whether the bridge collapse was actually caused by 
microfractures in its box girders. Following Heider (1958), Jones and Davis (1965), Jones et al. 
(1972), Kelley (1967, 1971, 1972, 1973), Kelley and Michela (1980), and Weiner et al. (1971), 
we will call such problems causal attribution problems, though many other labels might have 
been appropriate as well: diagnostic inference problems, explanatory inference problems, and 
actual (or token) causation inference problems to name a few possible alternatives. 
 For Heider and the social psychologists influenced by him, attribution theory was an 
account of how people construct causal explanations, and the theory was primarily intended to 
describe how people explain the actions of others, e.g. by appeal to intentions, personality, 
situational factors, and so on.i Kelley (1973, 107) gives several examples of the kinds of 
questions of social perception that the theory was designed to handle, including the following 
(quoted verbatim): 
 If a person is aggressively competitive in his behavior, is he this kind of person, or is he 
 reacting to situational pressures? 
 
 If a person advocates a certain political position, does this reflect his true opinions, or is it 
 to be explained in some other way? 
 
  If a person fails on a test, does he have low ability, or is the test difficult? 
 
According to Kelley, “In all such instances, the questions concern the causes of observed 
behavior and the answers of interest are those given by the man in the street … what Heider has 
called ‘naïve psychology.’” In the fifty years since Heider, psychologists and philosophers have 
made several suggestions about how ordinary causal cognition works. Various researchers have 
implicated ANOVA-like covariation (Kelley 1973), knowledge of mechanisms (Ahn et al. 1995), 
causal fields (Mackie 1965, 1974; Einhorn and Hogarth 1986), violations of normality (Hilton 
and Slugoski 1986; Knobe 2009; Hitchcock and Knobe 2009), and blameworthiness (Alicke 
1992), to name just a few.  
 In this chapter, we survey several recent suggestions for understanding causal attribution, 
paying special attention to how the large body of research in attribution theory is related to recent 
work on graphical causal models. Here is how we will proceed. In Section 1, we situate causal 
attribution problems within a graphical causal modeling approach to causal reasoning. In Section 
2, we review some recent research on structural approaches to causal attribution. In Section 3, we 
discuss a model that augments causal structure with a default-deviant distinction. In Sections 4 
and 5 we discuss broadly normative considerations that influence causal attributions. Then we 
conclude in Section 6 with a discussion of some open questions and topics that we neglect in this 
chapter owing to the limitations of space. 
 
 
1. Graphical Causal Models and Causal Attributions 
 
Graphical causal models are an increasingly popular approach to thinking about causation in the 
philosophy and psychology literatures (see Burns and McCormack 2009; Danks THIS 
VOLUME; Fernbach and Sloman 2009; Glymour 2001; Glymour 2010; Gopnik et al. 2004; 
 Gopnik and Schulz 2007; Griffiths and Tenenbaum 2009; Lagnado and Sloman 2006; Lagnado 
et al. 2007; Park and Sloman 2013; Park and Sloman THIS VOLUME; Pearl 2000; Reips and 
Waldmann 2008; Rottman and Keil 2012; Rottman et al. 2014; Schulz et al. 2007; Sloman 2005; 
Sobel and Kushnir 2003; and Spirtes et al. 2000). In graphical causal modeling, we begin with a 
primitive relation of direct structural causation that takes variables as its relata. If a variable X is 
a direct structural cause of another variable Y with respect to some collection V of variables, then 
we write X → Y in a directed graph over V. As an illustration, we will provide a graphical model 
for the following simple story. In a certain park, there are two clowns, Bozo and Zobo. Also, 
there are lots of peculiar children. What makes the children peculiar is the causal law that 
governs when they smile. Each child is such that she smiles just in case she receives a balloon 
from a clown. To model this story, we use three binary variables: B, Z, and S. For each child, the 
variable B represents whether or not Bozo gives the child a balloon, the variable Z represents 
whether or not Zobo gives the child a balloon, and the variable S represents whether or not the 
child smiles. According to the story, both B and Z are direct structural causes of S. And we 
represent that fact with the graph in Figure 1: 
 
Figure 1: Causal Graph for the Clown Story 
 
Formally, a causal model is a pair <V, F> consisting of a collection V of variables and a 
collection F of functions relating elements of V. For each variable V ∈ V, there is a function fV ∈ 
F that either specifies the value of V directly (in which case, V has no causes in the model and is 
 said to be exogenous) or specifies how the value of V is determined by the values of the direct 
structural causes of V. In the clown-smile story, we have the following equations: 
  Z = UZ 
  B = UB 
  S = B ∨ Z 
 
Where UB and UZ are the values that the functions fB and fZ assign to B and Z, respectively. 
(Typically, variables like UB are interpreted as representing all of the unmeasured causes of the 
associated variable—in this case, B.)  
 We can give a non-reductive definition of direct structural causation in terms of ideal 
interventions that set the values of selected variables to specific values. The basic idea is to 
imagine testing whether one variable causes another by first holding every other variable fixed 
and then wiggling the first variable. If the second wiggles along, then the first causes the second. 
The formal construction looks like this. Suppose the variables X and Y are members of the 
collection V of all of the random variables in our model. Let Z be the collection V \ {X, Y}, and 
let YW=w denote the value Y would have if one were to set the variables in W to the values w by 
directly manipulating them. We can then say that X is a direct structural cause of Y relative to V 
iff there exists a vector z of values for the variables in Z and a pair of values x1 and x2 for X such 
that YZ=z, X=x1  YZ=z, X=x2. With these formal tools in hand,  a causal attribution  problem amounts 
to saying, for a pair of variables V1 and V2 evaluated with respect to some unit u, whether or not 
V1(u) = v1 is an actual cause of V2(u) = v2. 
 Consider Bozo and Zobo again. Suppose that Bozo, but not Zobo, gives little Suzy a 
balloon in the park, and Suzy smiles—as she must according to the structural equations: 
  Z(Suzy) = 0 
  B(Suzy) = 1 
  S(Suzy) = B ∨ Z = 1 
 
 Where B(u) equals one if Bozo gives a balloon to unit u and equals zero if Bozo does not give a 
balloon to unit u. Where, similarly, Z(u) equals one of Zobo gives a balloon to unit u and equals 
zero if Zobo does not give a balloon to unit u. And where S(u) equals one if unit u smiles and 
equals zero if unit u does not smile. In this case, although both B and Z are structural causes of S, 
only B(Suzy) = 1 is an actual cause of S(Suzy) = 1. 
 Cases like the clown story are straightforward. Many will agree that Bozo—but not 
Zobo—actually caused Suzy to smile. However, as the story illustrates, the actual causes of a 
variable taking on the value it does are not always equivalent to the graphical ancestors of that 
variable or to the value(s) taken by those graphical ancestors. In order to identify the actual 
causes of a given variable taking on a specific value, we need more than just a list of the target 
variable’s structural causes. But exactly what the something more should be turns out to be a 
very difficult question. 
 
 
2. Actual Causation and Causal Structure 
 
Several competing theories of actual causation have appealed to purely structural features of 
causal models as the extra something.ii The accounts have varying degrees of complexity, but the 
basic idea for each account is that a variable taking on some value is an actual cause of another 
variable taking on some value if there is some appropriate, possibly non-actual context in which 
the second variable taking on its actual value counterfactually depends on the first variable 
taking on its actual value. To illustrate how such proposals are supposed to work in a bit more 
detail, consider Woodward’s (2003) account of actual causation. 
 When X is a direct structural cause of Y, we write X  Y. A path of length n > 0 from a 
variable Vi to another variable Vj in a directed graph is a sequence V(1), …, V(n+1) such that Vi = 
 V(1), Vj = V(n+1), and V(k)  V(k+1) for k = 1, …, n. Let W denote an ordered n-tuple of variables, 
let w denote an ordered n-tuple of values of the variables in W, and let the expression do(W = w) 
denote an ordered n-tuple of manipulations that set the variables in W to the values in w. We say 
that w is in the redundancy range of the path P if carrying out the manipulations in do(W = w) 
leaves all of the variables on the path P at their actual values. 
 Now, according to Woodward (2003, 74-77), X(u) = x is an actual cause of Y(u) = y iff 
the following two conditions are satisfied: 
 (H1)  The actual value of X is x and the actual value of Y is y, for unit u. 
 (H2)   There exists a path P from X to Y and there exist manipulations do(X = x*) 
   for x* ≠ x and do(W = w) for w in the redundancy range of P such that 
   YX=x*(u) ≠ y whenever the variables in W are fixed by the manipulation 
   do(W = w). 
 
In other words, X(u) = x is an actual cause of Y(u) = y if one can find some path P from X to Y 
and some choice of (possibly non-actual) values for all of the variables not on path P such that 
the variables on P retain their actual values and some change in the value of X would result in a 
change in the value of Y, if one were to set the variables not on path P to those values. 
 If we think of graphical modeling accounts of actual causation (like Woodward’s) as 
models of naïve causal attributions, then they make predictions about what people will say in 
various cases. Though no one has published direct tests of these models, Livengood compared 
folk attributions of causation in a pilot study involving two simple voting scenarios. Each 
participant saw one of two vignettes describing a small election. In one vignette, every vote for 
the winning candidate is pivotal for the outcome, meaning that the result counterfactually 
depends on each of the votes for the winning candidate. In the other vignette, the outcome is 
over-determined: the result does not counterfactually depend on any single vote. The vignette 
with counterfactual dependence reads like this: 
  Thirteen votes were cast in an election involving three candidates, Smith, Jones, and 
 Murphy. The vote totals were as follows: 
 
 Smith     6 
 Jones     5 
 Murphy     2 
 
 Greg voted for Smith. Was Greg’s vote a cause of Smith winning the election?  [yes / no]  
 
The other vignette was identical except that the 13 votes were assigned differently: ten for Smith, 
two for Jones, and one for Murphy. The relative percentage of “yes” answers for each of the two 
vignettes is pictured in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Causal Attributions with and without Counterfactual Dependence 
 
 Understood as models of ordinary causal attributions, all of the graphical accounts predict that 
Greg’s vote will be counted as a cause of Smith winning the election regardless of whether the 
outcome counterfactually depends on Greg’s vote.iii But people do not treat Greg’s vote the same 
way in both cases.iv Livengood’s study raises some doubt about the adequacy of graphical 
models of actual causation as accounts of naïve causal attribution, but it is hardly definitive. 
 A different graphical modeling proposal by Chockler and Halpern (2004) has been more 
extensively tested. The main idea is to measure the degree of causal responsibility of a given 
variable’s value in terms of the number of changes that would need to be made to the actual 
model in order to make the target variable’s value pivotal. In the counterfactual-dependence 
condition of the voting experiment, we do not need to make any changes to the model for Greg’s 
vote to be pivotal. Greg’s vote is already pivotal in the actual model. By contrast, in the no-
dependence condition we need to make three changes—move three votes from Smith to Jones—
in order to make Greg’s vote pivotal.  
 Chockler and Halpern (2004) propose to measure the degree of causal responsibility of 
X(u) = x for Y(u) = y according to the equation 
1
deg( , )
1
X x Y y
N
  

  
 
where deg is degree of causal responsibility, and N is the minimal number of changes needed in 
order to make X(u) = x pivotal with respect to Y(u) = y. In Livengood’s election vignettes, Greg’s 
degree of causal responsibility is 1 in the dependence condition and ¼ in the no-dependence 
condition. 
 Gerstenberg and Lagnado (2010) tested Chockler and Halpern’s proposal against two 
other models—the counterfactual model and the matching model—with the Triangle Game. In 
the Triangle Game, participants are given a short period of time to count the number of triangles 
 in a complex display. Participants played as part of a group, and the conditions under which a 
team won or lost were manipulated. For example, winning might require all of the players to 
give answers close enough to the truth, or winning might require at least one of the players to 
give an answer close enough to the truth. After answering, participants saw the correct answer 
and the answers given by the other players. Then they were asked to rate each player’s degree of 
responsibility for the team’s win or loss. 
 Gerstenberg and Lagnado looked at how well the predictions of the three models 
correlated with the responsibility ratings of their participants. They found that the median 
correlation between model and participant was greatest for the structural model and that the 
structural model had the best fit to the ratings of 52 of their 69 participants. Lagnado et al. (2013) 
improve on the model by incorporating a second structural feature: how important some 
variable’s value is expected to be before any of the values are known. 
 The structural models considered by Lagnado and colleagues are designed to handle 
attributions of causal responsibility when many variables contributed to some outcome, which 
limits their applicability. A more serious limitation, which plagues structural models of actual 
causation generally, is the threat of isomorphisms (Hall 2007; Halpern and Hitchcock 
forthcoming). To illustrate, consider the following two cases due to Hiddleston (2005): 
 Overdetermination: Billy and Suzy both throw a rock at a window at the same time.  
 Both rocks reach the window, shattering it upon impact. 
 
 Bogus Prevention: Killer plans to poison Victim’s coffee, but has a change of heart and 
 refrains from administering the lethal poison. Bodyguard puts an antidote in the coffee 
 that would have neutralized the poison (had there been any present). Victim drinks the 
 coffee and (of course) survives. 
 
Simple graphical models of both Overdetermination and Bogus Prevention have the same v-
shaped causal structure as the model of Bozo and Zobo in Section 1. They’re structurally 
 isomorphic. Hence, any purely structural account of actual causation must treat Billy, Suzy, 
Bozo, Zobo, Killer, and Bodyguard exactly alike. Yet, to many it has seemed that in 
Overdetermination, both Billy and Suzy are actual causes of the window shattering, while in 
Bogus prevention, Bodyguard is not an actual cause of Victim surviving.v 
 
 
3. Modeling the Default-Deviant Distinction 
 
Many researchers (e.g. Menzies 2004, 2007; Hall 2007; Halpern and Hitchcock forthcoming; 
Hitchcock 2007; Hitchcock and Knobe 2009; Livengood 2013) have inferred from the problem 
of isomorphisms and other considerations that purely structural accounts of actual causation need 
to be supplemented with a default-deviant distinction. Identifying some values as default and 
some as deviant would allow modelers to distinguish isomorphic causal models and better 
capture ordinary causal attributions. But there are many different ways to augment structural 
models with a default-deviant distinction. In this section, we describe Hitchcock’s (2007) attempt 
to incorporate defaults into graphical causal models. 
 Let <V, F> be a causal model, and let X, YV. Define a causal network connecting X to 
Y in <V, F> to be the set N   V that contains exactly X, Y and all variables Z in V lying on a 
path from X to Y in <V, F>. Say that a causal network N connecting X to Y is self-contained iff 
for all ZN, if Z has parents in N, then Z takes a default value when all of its parents in N take 
their default values and all of its parents in V \ N take their actual values. According to 
Hitchcock, counterfactual dependence is necessary and sufficient for actual causation in a self-
contained network, a claim he formalizes as follows: 
 TC: Let <V, F> be a causal model, let X, YV, and let X = x and Y = y. If the causal 
 network connecting X to Y in <V, F> is self-contained, then X = x is an actual cause of  
 Y = y in <V, F> if and only if the value of Y counterfactually depends on the value of X in 
 <V, F>. 
  
If TC is a correct description of the psychology of causal attribution, we can make predictions 
provided we have the right causal model and the right choice of default values for the variables 
in the model.vi 
 Livengood et al. (ms) tested Hitchcock’s TC using modified versions of a thought 
experiment due to Knobe. In one experiment, participants read a story about Lauren and Jane, 
who work at a company with an unstable computer system such that if more than one person logs 
in at the same time, the system crashes. Participants are told that one day, both women log into 
the system at the same time, and it crashes. They were then asked to rate their level of agreement 
with the following three claims: (1) Lauren caused the system to crash, (2) Jane caused the 
system to crash, and (3) the instability in the system caused it to crash. The results are pictured in 
Figure 3. 
  
Figure 3: Causal Attributions in Lauren and Jane Experiment 
 
Whether the data confirm or disconfirm TC as a model of causal attribution depends crucially on 
the choice of default values for the variables. If the default values for Lauren and Jane are “logs 
in,” then the experiment confirms Hitchcock’s account. But if the default values are “does not 
log in,” then the experiment is disconfirming. Livengood et al. argue that on Hitchcock’s 
account, the default value for Lauren and for Jane is “does not log in,” since the act of logging in 
is a voluntary departure from a rest state. But plausibly, participants regarded the actions of 
Lauren and Jane as having default status because they were in some sense normal actions in the 
circumstances.vii Such a possibility calls for more research on how people make normality 
judgments and on which kinds of normality judgments matter for causal attributions. We take up 
the latter topic in the next section. 
  
 
4. Varieties of Norms and Their Influence 
 
Hitchcock and Knobe (2009) suggest that normative considerations matter for causal attributions 
in virtue of the fact that paying attention to what is abnormal helps an agent to choose which 
counterfactuals to evaluate in a given context. The distinction between causes and mere 
background conditions, for example, depends on judgments of normality. Normal states of 
affairs are regarded as potential enabling background conditions; whereas, abnormal states of 
affairs are regarded as potential causes. Hitchcock and Knobe were not the first to draw a 
connection between causation and abnormality: Hart and Honoré (1959) discuss the role of 
abnormality in causal attribution in the law; Hilton and Slugoski (1986) discuss the interplay 
between norm-violation and information called on by covariational models of causal attribution; 
and Kahneman and Miller (1986) discuss the role of category norms in causal attributions.viii The 
main novelty in Hitchcock and Knobe’s theory—as we understand it—is that they explicitly treat 
norms and norm-violations as including much more than statistical facts or facts about how well 
one exemplifies membership in a natural kind or category. 
 Hitchcock and Knobe argue that only overall judgments of normality matter for causal 
attributions. However, they distinguish three types of norms relevant to causal attributions: 
statistical norms, prescriptive norms, and norms of proper functioning. Statistical norms have to 
do with what is typical or atypical. For example, a lightning strike in a forest is atypical, 
violating a statistical norm. But the presence of oxygen in the forest is typical, conforming to a 
statistical norm. By contrast, prescriptive norms have to do with what is right or wrong. For 
example, jaywalking violates a prescriptive norm, even if people regularly do so. And telling the 
complete truth to the police conforms to a prescriptive norm, even if people only rarely do so. 
 Finally, norms of proper functioning concern the behavior of mechanisms designed or selected to 
do a specific thing. For example, a smoke detector that beeps just in case there is smoke 
conforms to a norm of proper functioning, while a bicycle with a stuck brake violates a norm of 
proper functioning. In what follows, we will consider some recent evidence regarding the extent 
of the influence of various normative considerations on causal attributions. 
 Evidence that normative considerations affect judgments of actual causation comes from 
a range of studies, although the studies do not always support the theoretical picture advocated 
by Hitchcock and Knobe. Knobe and Fraser (2009) provided evidence that ordinary causal 
attributions are influenced by prescriptive norms in their pen case: 
The receptionist in the philosophy department keeps her desk stocked with pens. The 
administrative assistants are allowed to take pens, but faculty members are supposed to 
buy their own. 
 
The administrative assistants typically do take the pens. Unfortunately, so do the faculty 
members. The receptionist repeatedly e-mails them reminders that only administrators are 
allowed to take the pens. 
 
On Monday morning, one of the administrative assistants encounters Professor Smith 
walking past the receptionist’s desk. Both take pens. Later that day, the receptionist needs 
to take an important message...but she has a problem. There are no pens left on her desk. 
 
When asked to indicate the extent to which the administrative assistant and the professor caused 
the problem, participants were much more likely to indicate that the professor was a cause of the 
problem. Further evidence for the claim that prescriptive norms influence causal attributions is 
adduced in Kominsky et al. (2014). 
 Hitchcock and Knobe (2009) provide some evidence that norms of proper functioning 
also matter to causal attribution in their wires case: 
A machine is set up in such a way that it will short circuit if both the black wire and the 
red wire touch the battery at the same time. The machine will not short circuit if just one 
of these wires touches the battery. The black wire is designated as the one that is 
 supposed to touch the battery, while the red wire is supposed to remain in some other part 
of the machine.  
 
One day, the black wire and the red wire both end up touching the battery at the same 
time. There is a short circuit. (p. 604) 
 
After reading the wires case, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they thought 
the red or black wires touching the battery caused the machine to short circuit. Hitchcock and 
Knobe found that people were more willing to say that the red wire’s touching the battery was an 
actual cause of the short circuit.  
 
 
Figure 4: Hitchcock and Knobe (2009) Wires Case 
 
Hitchcock and Knobe explain their finding by appealing to the fact that according to its design, 
the red wire is not supposed to be touching the battery. 
  Roxborough and Cumby (2009) modified Knobe and Fraser’s pen case so that the 
administrative assistants do not typically take pens. They found that participants in their study 
made lower causal ratings for the professor than did participants in Knobe and Fraser’s study. 
Roxborough and Cumby take this to provide support for the claim that statistical norm violations 
do, indeed, affect folk judgments of actual causation. Sytsma et al. (2012) distinguish two sub-
types of statistical norm: population-level and agent-level.ix Sytsma et al. found that causal 
attributions were not sensitive to violations of population-level statistical norms and that while 
the agent-level statistical norms they tested mattered, they did so in the exact opposite way as 
that predicted by Hitchcock and Knobe: agent-typical behaviors were more likely to be judged as 
causes than were agent-atypical behaviors. The upshot is that we have good evidence that 
normative considerations affect causal attributions, but we do not currently have a good 
theoretical model describing precisely how they do so. 
 
 
5. Causal Attributions and the Desire to Blame 
 
A further wrinkle in providing an adequate account of causal attribution is the influence of a 
desire to blame on causal attributions. The best current account of the way praise and blame 
figure in causal attribution is Alicke’s Culpable Control Model (Alicke 1992, 2000; Alicke and 
Rose 2010; Alicke, Rose, and Bloom 2011). According to the CCM, in the realm of harmful and 
offensive actions, ordinary causal attributions are biased by a desire to blame those who we 
evaluate negatively. We exaggerate an actor’s causal role in bringing about an event since doing 
so allows us to support our desire to blame the actor.x 
 In support of the CCM, Alicke, Rose, and Bloom (2011) conducted experiments 
suggesting that blame judgments cause ordinary causal attributions. Participants read a story in 
 which a character named Edward Poole is shot by a character named Mr. Turnbull in Turnbull’s 
home. Alicke et al. varied whether Poole was characterized positively or negatively and the 
mode of Poole’s death. Participants in the positive condition were told that Poole was a physician 
who was house-sitting for the Turnbulls while they were out of town. Participants in the negative 
condition were told that Poole was an ex-convict who had broken into the house. 
 In each of the positive and negative characterization conditions, participants were told 
that Mr. Turnbull shot Poole in the chest. Each participant was told one of three things about the 
gunshot and Poole’s death—that the shot killed Poole instantly or that the shot killed Poole but 
he had an inoperable terminal brain tumor or that Poole had an aneurysm at almost the same time 
that he was shot. In all conditions, participants rated the extent to which Mr. Turnbull was the 
cause of Poole’s death and the extent to which Mr. Turnbull was deserving of blame. Alicke et 
al. found that ratings of blame statistically screen off the way Poole is characterized (positively 
or negatively) from causal ratings, indicating that blame ratings mediate the effect of Poole’s 
characterization on causal attributions. Moreover, they found that although the mode of Poole’s 
death was independent of the way Poole was characterized, those two variables were dependent 
conditional on causal attributions. They thus inferred that the correct causal model for 
participants in their experiment is as pictured in Figure 5. 
  
 
Figure 5: Causal Graph for Poole Experiment 
 
Since the pattern of counterfactual dependence is the same in both the positive and negative 
conditions, the Poole Experiment suggests that in some cases, what matters for causal attribution 
is not the salience of various counterfactuals—as maintained by the structural and norm-violation 
views we have seen so far—but the desire to blame. Experiments like the Poole Experiment raise 
a difficult problem in many cases as to whether the observed causal attributions are due to 
sensitivity to norms or rather are due to sensitivity to a desire to blame. Hence, in many 
instances, the CCM is in competition with norm-violation accounts of causal attribution, though 
we think that it is possible for some version of both views to be correct. 
 
 
6. Open Questions and Neglected Topics 
 
We are now nearly out of space, so it’s time to wrap things up. We have seen that graphical 
models offer an interesting way to unify much ongoing research on the problem of causal 
attribution. We considered some purely structural models of causal attribution and some of their 
limitations. We looked at one attempt to augment structural models with a default-deviant 
distinction and one serious modeling challenge for such approaches. We reviewed some research 
 suggesting that norms influence causal attributions and some research suggesting that causal 
attributions are biased by a desire to blame people. The questions addressed by the research we 
have reviewed are mostly still open. In closing, we want to mention a few more open questions 
and some issues that we did not have time to talk about in any detail. 
 One big question is the scope of the influence of norms on causal attribution. Causal 
attributions have been shown to happen in a wide range of cases that seem to lack norms of the 
sort that figure in Hitchcock and Knobe’s account. These range from cases of launching and 
causal perception (Michotte 1963; Scholl and Tremoulet 2000; Scholl and Nakayama 2002), to 
related force dynamics cases (Talmy 1988; Wolff 2007), to attributions based on touch (Wolff et 
al. ms), to covariational cases (Danks et al. 2013), to simple vignette cases like Livengood’s 
voting experiment. Normative considerations matter, but they are not the whole story for causal 
attribution. And it is an open question exactly when and why they matter. 
 Another big question hinted at but not explicitly raised in this chapter is whether 
sensitivity of causal attributions to normative considerations, the desire to blame or praise, and so 
on is best understood as a standard to be embraced or as a bias to be avoided. Two related issues 
come up at this point. The first is whether the concept of causation itself has normative content.  
If the ordinary concept of causation is fundamentally normative in character (as suggested by 
McGrath 2005 and in a different way by Sytsma et al. 2012), then it is unsurprising and 
(perhaps) unthreatening that ordinary causal attributions are sensitive to normative 
considerations. But now the second issue arises. What exactly is the point of attributing 
causation? By what standard should we judge the success or failure of causal attributions? What 
benefit accrues to an agent in virtue of her ability to solve a causal attribution problem? Some 
attention has been paid to these and related questions, but much more research needs to be done 
 (see Hitchcock and Knobe 2009 and Danks 2013 for illuminating work on these issues and 
Fisher 2014 for a basic framework within which experimental philosophy of this sort might 
proceed). Related to these concerns is another issue that arises in many areas of experimental 
philosophy: namely, to what extent should we trust ordinary intuitions (whatever those are) about 
causation? The answer may very well depend on an interaction between the shape our concept 
takes and the ends to which we put that concept (see Korman 2009; Rose 2015; and Rose and 
Schaffer ms, for discussions of these issues in a different setting). 
 Owing to limitations of space, we have not been able to say anything about experimental 
work on causation by absence or omission (Livengood and Machery 2007; Wolff et al. 2010; and 
references therein), causal explanation (Livengood and Machery 2007; Lombrozo 2006, 2007, 
2010; Lombrozo and Carey 2006); the significance of causal language (Talmy 1988; Wolff et al. 
2005; Wolff and Song 2003); or the relationship between causal attribution and judgments of 
moral or legal responsibility (Gerstenberg and Lagnado 2010, 2012) to name just a few of many 
topics related to causal attribution. 
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 Endnotes 
 
i See Malle (2011) for an argument that psychologists have mostly misread Heider. 
 
ii See Hitchcock (2001); Woodward (2003); and Halpern and Pearl (2005) for examples. See Glymour et al. (2010) 
and Livengood (2013) for critical discussion. 
 
iii The graphical models say (roughly) that since there is a way of redistributing the votes such that under the 
redistribution, the outcome counterfactually depends on Greg’s vote, Greg’s vote is an actual cause of the outcome. 
See Livengood (2013) for much more detail. 
 
iv A total of 196 participants were recruited on the Philosophical Personality website and randomly assigned to either 
the counterfactual-dependence vignette or to the no-counterfactual-dependence vignette. Of the 103 assigned to the 
dependence vignette, 71 said that Greg was a cause of Smith winning (68.9%); whereas, of the 93 assigned to the 
no-dependence vignette, 33 said that Greg was a cause of Smith winning (35.5%). A chi-square test of proportions 
shows that the proportion of “yes” answers was statistically significantly different in the two conditions: χ2 = 20.63, 
df = 1, p = 5.6e-6. According to Cohen’s h, the effect size is given by h = arcsin(0.689) – arcsin(0.355) = 0.397, 
which would ordinarily be classified as somewhere between a small and a medium effect. Both proportions were 
also statistically different from chance, though in different directions. 
 
v Purely structural accounts of actual causation must treat isomorphic causal structures the same way. Chockler and 
Halpern’s account as well as Gerstenberg and Lagnado’s development are purely structural, and the 
Overdetermination and Bogus Prevention cases appear to be isomorphic. And yet, the Overdetermination and Bogus 
Prevention cases appear to elicit different judgments. If the cases are really isomorphic and if ordinary people really 
say different things about the two, then the accounts are deficient. No data has been gathered on this question as far 
as we know. Moreover, Blanchard and Schaffer (forthcoming) argue that the simple model on which 
Overdetermination and Bogus Prevention appear to be isomorphic is not apt and that differences in the judgments 
elicited by Overdetermination and Bogus Prevention may be explained by differences in the structural models that 
are appropriate for the two cases. 
 
vi What makes a choice of causal model or default values the right one depends on one’s goals and on one’s attitudes 
toward psychological models. For example, if the goal is to say how the cognitive mechanism works, the right 
causal model and default values will need to reflect representations that people actually have, but if the goal is more 
instrumental, the right causal model and default values might just be the ones that let a researcher reliably predict 
behavior. 
 
vii An interesting alternative suggested by Knobe (personal communication) is that deviant status might be 
something that comes in degrees, and that people might regard an event as more causal to the extent that it is 
deviant. Halpern and Hitchcock (forthcoming) provide one framework for integrating graded causality, norms, and 
pivotality. 
 
viii Hitchcock and Knobe were well-aware of previous work on the relation between abnormality and causation. They 
explicitly discuss Hart and Honoré, Kahneman and Miller, Hilton, and others in their paper. 
 
ix Population-level statistical norms are statistical norms relative to a group of individuals. For instance, it’s a 
population-level statistical norm that two year old children don’t smoke: statistically speaking, two year old 
children, as a group, tend not to smoke cigarettes. In contrast, agent-level statistical norms are statistical norms 
relative to a particular agent’s pattern of behavior. For instance, Aldi is a two year old who smokes every day 
(http://abcnews.go.com/Health/smoking-baby-today/story?id=14453373). While Aldi’s smoking a cigarette is 
abnormal at the population level, it’s a normal behavior for him. 
 
x For ease, we are only discussing the role of blame in causal judgment.  But, as Alicke, Rose, and Bloom (2011) 
argue, causal assessments can also be influenced by a desire to praise. 
                                                 
